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The previous financial crisis has revealed the importance of risk in the financial and business cycle 
within the economy. This paper examines relationship among three cycles in the economy, namely (i) 
business cycle macro risk, (ii) credit cycle and (iii) risk cycle, and their impacts toward individual bank 
performance. We examine the responses of individual bank credit cycle and risk cycle toward a shock 
in business cycle macro risk and its consequence to the bank performance. We use Indonesian data for 
period of 2005q1 to 2014q4. We use unbalanced panel data of individual banks’ balance sheet with 
Panel Vector Autoregressive approach based on GMM style estimation by implementing PVAR package 
developed by Abrigo and Love (2015). The result shows dynamic relationship between business cycle 
macro risk and financial risk cycles. The study also observes prominent role of risk cycles in driving bank 
performance. We also show the existence of financial accelerator phenomenon in Indonesian banking 
system, in which financial cycles precede the business cycle macro risk.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The period after the financial crisis is always followed by the introduction of new set of regulations 
that tighten the activity in the financial sector, particularly banks. In the international sphere 
this can be seen from the introduction and the implementation period of the Basel Rules by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), which is a committee of central banks 
from various countries around the world. Basel I was officially introduced in 1988, triggered by 
Latin America debt crises in early 1980s (BIS Website, accessed 2017) and US Saving and Loan 
(S&L) crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s (FDIC Website, accessed 2017). In the 1997-98 
many Asian countries were hit by financial crises. This was followed by the proposal for Basel 
II. After a long process, it was launched in 2004 and was called the Revised Capital Framework. 
Likewise, the Basel III, which was introduced in 2010, was a reaction to 2008 financial crisis.
Figure 1.
Sequence of Financial Crisis and Basel Accord
- Early 1980s -
Latin America
Debt Crisis
- Late 1980s -
US Saving &
Loans Crisis
- 1988 -
Basel I
- 1997-1998 -
Asian Financial
Crisis
- Early 2000s -
DotCom Crisis
- 2004 -
Basel II
- 2008 -
US Subprime
Mortgage Crisis
Source: Collaborated from many sources
- 2010 -
Basel III
Each Basel regulation is not introduced to replace the previous one, but rather to revise 
or to complement with more detailed and tighter regulations on the banking system. Basel I, 
which is the first attempt to regulate bank’s capital ratio took focus only on the application of 
minimum ratio of capital to risk weighted assets. This rule is then revised to be more detailed 
and stringent by Basel II which governs: (i) the application of more extensive minimum capital 
requirements, (ii) the strict process of monitoring and assessment of capital adequacy, and (iii) 
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the implementation of obligations for banks to publish their financial statements to encourage 
market discipline and disclosure of information. Afterward, Basel III tightened the regulation even 
more by including: (i) the provision of a layer of additional capital reserves, (ii) the provision of 
counter-cyclical capital reserves, (iii) a tightening on the limit of leverage ratio, (iv) the application 
of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) as new indicators of 
liquidity, and (v) the imposition of a special classification for Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions (SIFI) as explained by BIS (BIS Website, accessed 2017).
Figure 2.
Derivative Market Transactions across Regions
Figure 3.
Derivative Market Transactions by Type
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The trend of tightening financial regulation is generally viewed as necessary to 
accommodate the rapid development in the financial market. As shown by Figure 3, trend of 
derivative market transactions grew exponentially since 1990. This growth is not only in terms 
of value and total transactions, but also the number of the derivative products in the market. 
The development of necessary regulations is needed to keep up with these developments in 
the market.  
The regulations trend which are always coincidence crisis shape regulatory cycle which 
is in line with business cycle / economy. In general, business cycle is shown by fluctuation of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a country from its trend line. However, following a formal 
model developed by Acharya & Naqvi (2012), this study employs Credit Default Swap (CDS) as 
proxy of business cycle. Then we prefer to address business cycle as business cycle macro risk, 
since CDS does not fully represent business cycle.
Furthermore, as in BGG (1999), the business cycle is always interconnected with financial 
cycle, which is usually represented by the credit cycle. This study then tries to relax the financial 
406 Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 4, April 2017
cycle by also examining the risk cycle besides of the credit cycle. The credit cycle is characterized 
by the flow of bank lending to the economy in order to perform the intermediation function. 
In line with the credit cycle, the risk cycle is characterized by risk level in each time period of 
the company both financial institutions and firms in general. In this study the focus is on the 
bank’ balance-sheet as banking system is accounted for about 78% of asset of financial system 
in Indonesia (OJK, 2017).
The tendency of more tightened revision of regulation might squeeze the ability of 
financial institutions (banks) to innovate and to conduct risky activity. Although it will result in 
more resilient banking system, it will also impact bank’s performance, since banks opportunity 
to make higher return from conducting riskier activity is becoming more limited. Moreover, 
banks also face direct opportunity costs as a result of tighter regulation. For examples, the 
implementation of (i) additional layer of reserve requirement; and higher (ii) Loan Loss Provision 
(LLP), may limit more third-party funds from being disbursed to the market, while it should 
keep paying the cost of the funds. However, without such policies, the market will be under 
threat of huge losses in the event of failure (default) of one bank or the entire banking system. 
So, there is a trade-off between system resiliency and bank performance (profitability) from 
regulating banking system.
As in with business cycle, the credit cycle and the risk cycle also observe fluctuations by 
time. The relationship between these cycles are interesting and have been becoming focus of 
regulator, especially whether the regulator should take part to maintain these cycle to prevent 
excessive lending and risk-taking by the banks. If they should, which cycle they are better to 
focus on? Credit cycle or risk cycle?
Figure 4. Tri-Cycles and Bank Performance
Business
Cycle
Macro Risk
Credit Cycle Risk Cycle
Bank
Performance
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Figure 4 describes the main focus of this study in stylized way. Each arrow represent 
hypothesis to be tested in this study. This study examines the cyclicality relationship between 
the business cycle toward the credit cycle and the risk cycle. By comparing the relationship 
of those Tri-Cycles, it can be determined which cycle should receive more attention from the 
regulators. So that the implementation of the countercyclical regulation could be better targeted.
Furthermore, this study examines the relationship of the credit cycle and the risk cycle 
toward the performance of individual banks. This phase of analysis focus on the impact of 
the Tri-Cycles to the bank’s performance. Especially, to measure the cost borne by the banks 
resulted from controlled of credit cycle and risk cycle. The results of this study might provide 
insight for the regulator to estimate the impact of regulating lending and risk-taking to the 
performance of individual banks.
II.  THEORY
Since 1980s, the business cycle literatures has been largely driven by Standard Real Business 
Cycle (RBC) developed by Kydland and Prescott (1982) which assume no financial frictions in 
the economy. The theory was revised by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist / BGG (1999) which 
revealed important role of Financial Accelerator – which is refer to credit market friction and 
financial cycle – in determining the business cycle dynamics. Then, 2007/8 financial crisis 
stimulated a new strand of literatures of business cycle which not only accommodate financial 
cycle, but also risk dynamics or risk cycle.
Burns and Mitchell (1946); in Jacobs (1998), one of the first among others, defined 
business cycle as:
“ . . . a type of fluctuations found in the aggregate economic activity of nations that 
organize their work mainly in business enterprises: a cycle consists of expansions occurring 
at about the same time in many economic activities, followed by similarly general recessions, 
contractions, and revivals which merge into the expansion phase of the next cycle . . .”
The definition above embodies some notable features of business cycle, which becomes 
focus of many literature on this field. The first one is expansion, the period of surging business 
activity and gross domestic product expands until the period reach its peak. This period is also 
known as an economic recovery. The highest point of a cycle, the peak, is a key period in which 
the economic bubble get burst and economy the economy turns into contraction period. This 
period is a phase in which ecoomy as a whole is in decline. The lowest point of this phase, 
which signals the reversal or revival, is called recession.
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Figure 5. The EBCR Framework
2.1.  Development of Business Cycle Theory
2.1.1.  Econometric Business Cycle Research (EBCR)
Econometric Business Cycle Research (EBCR) is a term referring to strand of literatures combining 
theoretical and statistical approach in studying business cycle. Term EBCR has been popularized 
for the first time by Tinbergen (1940). The EBCR approach was developed in some way as a 
critic toward the then-previous approach that did not combine theoretical framework with 
data specification (Jacobs, 1998).
2.1.2.  Real Business Cycle (RBC) Theory
Standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) model is based on seminal work of Kydland and Prescott 
(1982). In the model, a competitive market creates resource allocation that maximizes the 
household utility with limited budget constraint of each resource (Kiyotaki, 2011). On the 
standard model, the most prominent determinant of the business cycle are shock by the 
government budget and technological development (Romer, 2012).
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An ongoing debate is still going on about this theory ability to explain the heterogeneity 
of households and companies in the real world. This assumption is considered too strict. 
Even so, it encourages the further development/refinement of the RBC theory and not rather 
neglected its reliability.
In general, RBC theory explains how factors of production, namely labor, capital and 
other factors (such as technology and government budget) affect productivity (output) in the 
aggregate sense (Kiyotaki (2011) and Romer (2012)). In conditions where there is positive shock 
to productivity, the marginal product of labor will increase which will lead to a rise in real wage 
rates and labor supply quantity. The combined effect of rising wages and employment will drive 
the output to rise. However, because of the increase in productivity is only temporary, then the 
growth of output in the future will increase by lower pace than the present growth of output, 
and the growth of income and consumption will not rise as much as the output growth in the 
present (Kiyotaki, 2011). This condition will then encourage increase in investment and capital 
stock in the foreseeable future. This process then creates a new expansion phase. It applies in 
the opposite direction for the contraction phase.
One of the most criticized aspect of RBC model is its ignorance of the frictions in financial 
market. This stylized feature of the model departed from the strong assumption of efficient 
financial market. The hypothesis, which is very strict, assumes that in time of business fluctuation, 
every agent in the economy will instantly do recalculation of its economic behavior and decision 
to adapt with the change. Consequently, there is no such frictions in the financial market. Latter, 
in the late 1990s, BGG (1999) promoted a model to revised this view in examining business cycle.
2.1.3.  Financial Accelerator
BGG (1999) are the first to develop a framework which they called as “Financial Accelarator”. In 
their seminal work, they developed a dynamic general equilibrium model to reveal the frictions 
in the credit market which play prominent role in determining business fluctuations. The term 
Financial Accelerator refers to endogenous developments in the credit markets which amplify 
and propagate shocks to the macroeconomy. 
They materialized financial frictions in their model in three aspects. First, they internalized 
money and price stickiness to examine role of the friction in the transmission of monetary policy. 
Second, they relax the efficient financial market assumption by introducing lags in investment. 
Third, they relax the assumption of firms homogeneity in order to describe the condition in 
which every borrower has different access to capital markets. The main contribution of the 
model is how the financial accelerator give significant influence on business cycle dynamics.
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Figure 6.
Response toward Shock in Asset Quality
Departing from the standard RBC model, and influenced by Financial Accelerator model, 
Kiyotaki (2011) describes the effects of the business cycle toward the credit cycle. In general, 
relation between the two cycles are influenced by asset quality at every phase of the business 
cycle. In the period of expansion, there is substantial increase in the value of assets. The increase, 
including the value of the assets of the firm, make the firm has higher collateral to be utilized 
to get credit. Moreover, the business boom condition make firm’s balance sheet substantially 
sound, which is a sign of growth. These conditions make the firm could obtain more credit to 
finance new investments and expand further. In line with this, the good economic conditions 
make the firm able to repay their credit and then it has good credit rating. The level of non-
performing loan (NPL) in the banking system is then generally low.
Capital stock, Output
No Friction
Financial Friction
Time
Source: Kiyotaki (2011)
The reverse condition happens when the economy is in contraction phase. Impairment 
of assets (the burst of the boom) and deterioration of economic conditions will generally make 
the firm experience a decrease in performance and asset values. As a result, loan repayments 
begin to deteriorate (NPL increase). On the other hand, the banks tend to have lower credit 
growth. This happens due to (1) deterioration of the financial condition of the firm/debtor; (2) 
the impairment of the value of assets/collateral; and (3) the bank’s internal condition is getting 
worse by the rising of NPL rate.
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Figure 7.
Expansion and Contraction Sequence in Business Cycle
2.2.  Empirical Studies
2.2.1.  Relationship between Cycles
Bertay, et.al (2015) in their study analyzed the cyclicality of individual bank lending toward 
business cycle. They segregated the sample based on the ownership, state-owned banks and 
private banks. The result shows the state-owned bank proved to be less cyclical than the private 
banks. The finding applies particularly in countries with higher governance index. In case for 
developed country, the result even shows counter-cyclical lending behavior by state-owned 
banks. The study came to the conclusion that state-owned banks can effectively play counter-
cyclical role toward the country business cycle. State-owned banks could play a stabilizing role 
of the business cycle and financial cycle. However, Bertay, et.al. (2015) also found that loans 
allocation made by state-owned banks tend to be bad so that from business point of view, the 
behavior of the state-owned bank is not economically optimal because of its role to support 
government policy. The study therefore concluded that implementation of micro- and macro-
prudential banking regulations such as monetary policy and statutory reserves are better tools 
than altering behavior of the state-owned banks. Empirical model applied in the study are the 
first-difference GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991) and the system GMM of Blundell and Bond 
(1998) enhanced by Windmeijer (2005). The study was conducted with a sample of 1,633 banks 
from 111 countries in the 1999-2010 time period.
Ferri, et.al. (2014) conducted an analysis of influence between bank ownership and lending 
behavior of individual banks and its cyclicality over the business cycle. The sample of the study 
is banks in Europe in the period 1999-2011. Segregation of the sample conducted between 
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profit-oriented bank (conventional bank) and not-for-profit bank (cooperative banks and saving 
banks). In his study Ferri, et.al. (2014) used first difference GMM by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
The result showed that there was no significant difference between the two groups of banks 
based on profit orientation. The main factors that can explain the behavior of bank lending is 
the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB).
Ibrahim (2016) conducted a study to compare the lending cyclicality between conventional 
banks and Islamic banks in Malaysia. The sample used in the study includes 21 conventional banks 
and 16 Islamic banks in Malaysia during the period 2001-2013. The data used is unbalanced 
panel data. The results showed that generally the behavior of bank lending is pro-cyclical to the 
business cycle. However, by segregating the samples it is observed different cyclicality behavior 
between conventional banks and Islamic banks. Pro-cyclical behavior only observed at samples 
of conventional banks. While for Islamic banks, business cycle appears to have no effect on its 
lending behavior. In fact, the estimation results obtained show a negative value indicating a 
counter-cyclical lending behavior of Islamic banks. Similar with Bertay, et.al. (2016), the model 
estimation used in the study is the first-difference GMM and GMM system. 
As for the case of Indonesia, Pramono, et.al. (2015) in their study examined the influence 
of Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCB) policy on the growth of bank-lending in Indonesia. 
Estimation sample period is 2005Q1 to 2015Q2. Just like Bertay, et.al. (2015) and Ibrahim, 
et.al. (2016), the study used both the First Difference GMM and System GMM for estimation.
2.2.2.  Individual Bank Performance
Glen & Mondragon-Velez, (2011) conducted a study of the effects of business cycles 
on the performance of the credit portfolio of commercial banks in developing countries. The 
study period is 1996-2008. The results obtained indicate that economic growth is the main 
determinant of the performance of the loan portfolio. While the interest rate is the second 
strongest determinant. The estimation results also showed that the relationship between loan 
loss provision and economic growth is non-linear in conditions where the economy is in a state 
of stress.
Guidara, Lai, Soumare, & Tchana (2013) conducted a study of co-movement between 
the level of capital buffer and business cycle for the six largest banks in Canada. The results 
found positive relationship between the two varaibels. The data used are quarterly data for 
the period of 1982-2010. The study results also showed that the implementation of the Basel 
regulatory framework does not affect cyclicality behavior of the banking industry in Canada. 
This suggests that banks in Canada are mostly well-capitalized.
Vithessonthi & Tongurai (2016) in his study analyze the effect of business cycles on the 
development of financial markets and the risk of individual banks. The samples used were 37 
bank went public in seven countries in South America. The result shows that the business cycle 
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is significantly affecting the banking risks. Besides, the development of financial markets also 
improve capital ratios and reduce the level of risk exposure of banks, indicating that financial 
market developments have lowered the banking risk.
Psillaki & Mamatzakis (2017) analyzing the impact of financial regulation and structural 
reforms and their effects on the efficiency of the banking industry. The sample used was a 
bank from 10 countries in Eastern and Central Europe in the period 2004-2009. Scores of cost 
efficiency is estimated using stochastic frontier analysis. The results obtained show that structural 
reforms in the labor market and businesses have a positive impact on the bank’s performance. It 
was also found that credit regulations raise the cost efficiency of the banks. As well, it appears 
that banks with stronger capital has a higher cost efficiency.
As for Indonesia case, Winata & Viverita (2013) analyzed the effect of the bank’s 
income structure to market-based performance for listed-banks in Indonesia. The study was 
conducted using panel data for the period 2004-2012. The result obtained suggest that 
income diversification does not have a significant effect on the performance of the banks in 
Indonesia. Meanwhile, other variables such as total assets, asset-to-equity ratio, NPL and ROA 
have significant influence on the bank’s performance, while the variable cost-to-income and 
loan growth has no significant effect on the performance of the bank.
Table 1.
Empirical Literature Review: Business Cycle and Credit Cycle
 No Author Analysis Variables Sample Result
1
2
3
4
Ibrahim (2016)
Bertay, et. al. (2015)
Ferri, et.al. (2014)
Pramono, et. al. (2015)
•	 Business	cycle
•	 Bank	lending
•	 Type	of	Banks
•	 Business	cycle
•	 Bank	lending
•	 Ownership
•	 Business	cycle
•	 Bank	lending
•	 Monetary	policy
•	 Business	cycle
•	 Bank	lending
•	 Counter-Cyclical	Buffer
•	 GDP
•	 Loan
•	 GDP
•	 Loan
•	 GDP
•	 Loan
•	 Policy	Rate
•	 GDP
•	 Loan
•	 Counter-	 	
	 Cyclical
	 Buffer
•	 Conventional	Bank	(Malaysia)
•	 Sharia	Bank	(Malaysia)
•	 111	countries
•	 State-Owned	Bank
•	 Private	Bank
•	 Conventional	Bank	(Europe)
•	 Cooperative	Bank	(Europe)
•	 Conventional	Bank	(Indonesia)
•	 Pro-cyclical
•	 Counter-cyclical
•	 Pro-cyclical
•	 Counter-cyclical
•	 Bank	lending	significantly		
	 correlated	with	monetary		
	 policy
•	 Pro-cyclical
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2.3.  Conceptual Framework
This conceptual framework refers to model developed by Acharya and Naqvi (2012). The 
overall economy in this model consists of several sectors, namely, the banking sector, savers, 
borrowers (both savers and borrowers are referred to as households, for simplicity), and the 
entrepreneurial sector (corporation).
2.3.1.  Bank Lending: Base Case
The framework is based on three-date model of a bank, in which at t = 0, the bank receives 
deposits D from risk-neutral investors (savers of the economy) with reservation utility . 
Depositors are compensated with r
D
, the (gross) rate of return on deposits – deposit rate. In  t 
= 1, the bank makes investments in projects (loans) L, while holding a fraction of a deposits as 
liquid reserves r. In t = 2, the bank-funded projects either success or fail, with the probability 
of success is given by q. The bank observes q after receiving deposits and sets r
L
, the (gross) 
rate of return on loans – lending rate.
Table 2.
Empirical Literature Review: Business Cycle and Bank Performance
 No Author Analysis Variables Sample Result
1
2
3
4
5
Glen	&	Mondragon-
Velez (2011)
Guidara	et.	al.	(2013)
Vinthessonthi	&	
Tongurai	(2016)
Psillaki	&	
Mamatzakis	(2017)
Winata	&	Viverita	
(2013)
•	 Business	cycle
•	 Credit	Performance
•	 Business	Cycle
•	 Capital	Buffer
•	 Basel	Framework
•	 Business	Cycle
•	 Financial	Development
•	 Bank	Risk
•	 Financial	Regulation
•	 Banking	industry		
	 Efficiency
•	 Bank’s	income	structure
•	 Market	based		
	 performance
•	 GDP
•	 Loan	Loss			
	 Provision
•	 GDP
•	 Capital	Buffer
•	 Basel	Dummy
•	 GDP
•	 Risk	Exposure
•	 Capital	Ratio
•	 Credit	regulation		
	 dummy
•	 Cost	efficiency
•	 Capital	ratio
•	 Income		 	
	 diversification		
 ratio
•	 Stock	return
•	 Conventional	Bank		 	
	 (Developing	Countries)
•	 Six	largest	banks	(Canada)
•	 37	listed	banks	(South		 	
	 America)
•	 10	countries	(Eastern	&			
	 Central	Europe)
•	 Listed	banks	(Indonesia)
•	 Non-linearity
•	 Pro-cyclical
•	 Basel	Framework	does	not		
	 affect	cyclicality
•	 Bank	risk	is	procyclical
•	 Regulation	increase		 	
	 efficiency
•	 Stronger	capital	raise		 	
	 efficiency
•	 Income	diversification		 	
	 does	not	affect		 	
	 performance
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Figure 8.
Three-date Model Framework
Bank reserves R are residual after the bank meets the loan demand:
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
- Bank raises deposits
- Bank observes success
 probability θ and seta
 lending rate r
L
 and
 borrowing rate r
D
- Investments made and
 bank sets aside resserves R
- Bank suffers early
 withdrawals, xD
- Bank incurs a penalty cost
 if xD > R
- Bank projects either
 succeed with probability
 θ of fail
- Payoffs divided
 among parties
(1)
The bank could experience withdrawals at , which is represented by random variable 
given by , where . Thus, the total amount of with drawals at  is given by . If 
, then the bank faces a liquidity shortage, and it incurs penalty, given by , 
which is proportional to the liquidity shortage, where . The bank owners’ problem 
is then summarized by:
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
subject to
and
where   is the expectations operator over the distribution of  and profit, , is given by:
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Equation (5) states that the bank chooses deposit and lending rates as well as the level of 
bank reserves so as to maximize its expected profits, , net of any penalty incurred in case of 
liquidity shortage and subject to the participation constraint of the depositors given by expression 
(3) and the budget constraint given by equation (4). The optimal gross lending rate is given by
(6)
(7)
(8)
where   is the elasticity of the demand for loans. The optimal gross 
deposit rate is given by
And, the optimal level of reserves is given by:
2.3.2.  Internal Bank Dynamics and Excessive Lending
Acharya and Naqvi (2012) build explicit model to explain the process behind excessive lending 
phenomenon. The model take focus on how managerial agency problems can have effect on 
bank lending policies. The bank manager has unobservable effort level, , such that , 
with assumption that although the loans are affected by effort, they are not fully determined by it.
Figure 9.
Extended Three-date Model Framework
t = 0 t = 0.5 t = 1 t = 2
- Principal offers contract
 to manager
- Manager chooses effort e
- Manager receives deposits D
 and observes success
 probability θ
- Manager sets r
L
 and r
D
- Loan demand L(r
L
)
 realized
- Manager makes
 investments and sets
 aside reserves R
- A fraction x of
 depositors
 withdraw early
- Bank incurs a penalty
 cost if xD > R
- Principal decides
 whether or not to
 conduct audit
- Manager is penalized
 contingent on the
 audit outcome
- Bank projects
 succeed with
 probability θ or fail
- Payoffs realized and
 divided among
 parties
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The manager earns income, , which can be interpreted as bonuses, which increases as 
the manager sell more loans. But the manager also faces a penalty, , if the principal conducts 
an audit and it is revealed that the manager had acted over-aggressively to increase loan volume 
by setting a loan rate lower than the one that maximizes the principal’s expected profits.
The managerial penalty is some proportion, , of the penalty cost incurred by the bank 
due to liquidity shortfalls. However, there is maximum penalty level received by the manager, 
, so that the managerial penalty is given by , where  
represents the liquidity shortfall, if any, and . Thus, the net wage earned by the 
manager is given by .
2.3.3.  Bank Liquidity Flush
Acharya and Naqvi (2012) assume an economy in which entrepreneurs have access to projects 
that yield a terminal cash flow  if it succeeds and zero otherwise. Macroeconomic risk is 
given by . 
The probability of success depends partly on the realization of the state variable, , and 
partly on the entrepreneurs’ effort decision, e, which identifies whether the entrepreneur is 
diligent ( ) or shirks ( ) in which case entrepreneurs extract a private benefit .
If the entrepreneur is diligent, the probability of success as before is given by , but in the 
presence of shirking the probability of success is , where . Entrepreneurs promise 
to pay the risk-neutral investors who invest directly in their projects a face value of  . The 
entrepreneur’s problem as maximizing the expected return is then:
(9)
(10)
(11)
Subject to the constraint:
and
Constraint (10) is the investor’s rationality constraint that says that the expected return 
to the investor must at least equal the investor’s reservation utility. Meanwhile constraint (11) 
means the expected entrepreneurial return conditional on the entrepreneur being diligent 
exceeds his expected return from shirking.
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Then, there is  such that, for , the entrepreneur’s offer to the investors are not 
enough to satisfy the investors’ reservation utility. Intuitively, if macroeconomic risk is sufficiently 
high, the probability of success is low, and thus, the entrepreneur has little incentive to exert 
effort and is better off by shirking and consuming his private benefit.
However, if the entrepreneurial projects are financed by banks instead of dispersed 
investors, then such moral hazard can be alleviated via monitoring. Formally, in the presence 
of bank borrowing, entrepreneurs suffer a cost from shirking, say, . As long as , the 
entrepreneur has no incentive to shirk.
Because investors earn on average  from depositing money in the bank, in the presence 
of entrepreneurial moral hazard, investors are better off by depositing their endowments in 
banks. However, if , entrepreneurs can attract investors by offering them an expected 
return slightly above . In summary, if investors observe  identically, then all investments are 
channeled directly into entrepreneurial projects if  and into banks if .
2.3.4.  Theoretical Framework: Modified
This study employs conceptual framework developed by Acharya and Naqvi (2012) with some 
modification. The main framework implemented in this study is based on equation (5), which is:
First modification, we distinguish the risk in the model, , into two risk. First,  macroeconomic 
risk, , which plays significant role in determining deposit flush received by the banks. 
Second, individual bank risk, , which is represented as the share of the performing loan 
compared to total loan made by the bank. By doing so, the conceptual framework in this study 
becomes as follow:
(12)
III.  METHODOLOGY
3.1.  Characteristic of the Data and Some Related Issues
This study employs quarterly unbalanced panel data from balance sheet of all conventional 
banks in Indonesia in the period 2005q1-2014q4. The main goal of this study is to measure 
magnitude of dynamic cyclicality between business cycles macro risk, credit cycles and risk 
cycle toward the performance of individual bank. Therefore, it is necessary for the empirical 
model to be able describe the dynamic relationship of the Tri-Cycles and its influence on the 
performance of the bank. 
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One of the benefits of the use of panel data is able to provide interpretation that can 
meet these objectives, in term of variation between individual and over-time (Baltagi, 2005). 
However, the utilization of unbalanced panel data, although not problematic, requires special 
attention. First, from the point of view of classical assumption, it makes the OLS estimators 
remain consistent and unbiased, but the standard error will be biased. Second, ANOVA methods 
cannot be perfectly applied for unbalanced data thus makes the property of unbiased in the 
optimal model of standard ANOVA are not met. Third, the asymptotic distribution of critical 
values of  unbalanced panel data becomes unbalanced. Nonetheless, the use of unbalanced 
panel data remains possible and common statistical software such STATA has automatically 
accommodated this type of (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). This study uses STATA 13 MP to perform 
estimation and data processing.
One of the most popular models for cycle analysis is dynamic panel model as used by 
Ferri, et.al. (2014), Bertay, et.al. (2015), Pramono, et.al. (2015) and Ibrahim (2016) in a study 
somewhat similar to this study. This model was chosen because of its ability to capture the 
dynamics between the two variables. So that it is very suitable for use in analyzing the relationship 
between two variables cycle.
The dynamic model in practical is implemented by entering the lag of the dependent 
variable as one of the independent variables (Baltagi, 2005). Dynamic panel model is 
characterized by the presence of more than one source of time persistence. Such conditions 
create dynamic panel model cannot be separated from the autocorrelation lag because of the 
presence of one of the dependent variables as independent variables. In addition, this model 
also cannot be separated from the heterogeneity among individuals who became observation.
Because of that, dynamic panel model is automatically not met the BLUE (Best Linear 
Unbiased Estimator) assumptions as owned OLS model standard and standard assumptions of 
GLS models (Baltagi, 2005). This happens because in dynamic panel model there is correlation 
between the independent variables with the error term. Because of that, the OLS estimators 
will be biased and inconsistent. Moreover, the standard GLS estimator cannot be used because 
there is a correlation between the variables predetermined by the error term. Furthermore, 
GLS models with instrument variable (IV) also cannot be used because of although it produces 
a consistent model, it did not provide an efficient parameter. This is due to the model GLS-IV 
does not use all the conditions of moment conditions.
Therefore, the use of dynamic panel model is not necessary to test classic assumptions 
on the data samples used. Dynamic panel model was essentially developed to be able to accept 
the conditions in which the classical assumptions are not met.
Specifically, dynamic panel model that will be used in this research is Panel Vector 
Autoregressive (PVAR) developed by Abrigo and Love (2015) based on GMM style estimation 
from Arellano and Bond (1991). Sprecifically, the GMM model is used in combination with a 
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robust estimator of Windmeijer (2005) to avoid problems of overidentification and downward 
bias (Baltagi, 2005).
3.2.  Overview of Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) Model
In line with the aim of this study, cyclical relationship between the Tri-Cycles is the object to 
be observed. Thus, this study needs such method that can observe potential bi-directional 
relationship between each cycle. Because of that, this study employs Vector Autoregressive 
(VAR) approach. VAR methodology is categorized as an extension of autoregressive (AR) model 
in term of its multi-variate characteristic. Furthermore, it also resembles simultaneous-equation 
modeling (SEM) style estimation (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). The main difference is, each 
variable in the model is treated as endogenous variable and lag of every variable in the system 
is considered as independent variable. 
This approach is then very suitable to fulfill the aim of this study. By placing every variable 
as dependent variable, it can observe bi-directional relationship of each cycle and also shows 
how each cycle affects bank performance. In the context of business cycle analysis, the approach 
might give insight of the dynamics between business cycle and financial cycle, which attracts 
big concern in the development of the literatures.
The other advantage is it has rich of features. VAR estimation has features of Impulse 
Response Function (IRF), Forecast-Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD), and also Granger-
Causality Test. These features make VAR estimation very popular for policy simulation. IRF 
describe describes response of each variable due to one standard deviation in other variable. 
Meanwhile FEVD decomposes degree of impact of each variable to the dependent variable. 
Granger-Causality test is useful in examining the potential bi-directional relationship between 
variables.
However, VAR approach has several disadvantages. First, it can be applied even as an 
a-theory approach. Researcher does not need basic theory and can simply put any variable into 
VAR system. This disadvantage then has been avoided in this study since the selection process 
of the variables in this study is all based on the theoretical framework as explained in Section 
3. Second, the coefficient result from VAR estimation cannot be interpreted directly. The result 
is interpreted only it term of its direction (positive or negative) and significance. 
Essentially, VAR estimation is developed for time-series process. However, as the availability 
of cross-individual data is increasing, VAR is getting popular to be implemented in panel 
estimation. However, standard built-in statistical package is not yet available to estimate Panel 
VAR. This study then employs PVAR user-based package developed by Abrigo and Love (2015) 
which uses GMM estimation to estimate Panel VAR.
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Theoretically, Panel VAR have the same structure as time-series VAR model. Each variable 
is treated as endogenous variable and also interdependent. The main difference is Panel VAR 
also observe cross-sectional dimension of the data. Panel VAR is also noticeable for several 
advantages, as revealed by Canova and Cicarelli (2013) that Panel VAR: (i) captures both 
static and dynamic interdependencies; (ii) in unrestrictive style treats individual variation; (iii) 
incorporates coefficient variations and the variance of the shocks in term of time series; and 
(iv) examine cross-sectional dynamic heterogeneities.
Think of  is stacked version of variable , while the  is vector of variables for unit 
of  i.e., . Individual is represented by . Meanwhile  
represents time. Common time-series VAR empirical form is:
Meanwhile Panel VAR empirical form is then:
where  is random disturbances in the form of  vector and  and  depend on 
the unit of observation, and  is the lag operator. 
3.3.  Empirical Model
Recalling equation (13) in Chapter 3, the bank profit is function is as follow:
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
So that the bank profit is function of:
Due to data characteristic, rather than using Loan Rate ( ) and Deposit Rate ( ), this 
study use data of Net Interest Margin, , which is difference of the  and . So equation 
(14) becomes:
Based on equation (15), an empirical model might be constructed as follow:
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where  is intercept, and  is parameter. Meanwhile  is the error-term. Both  and 
 are lag operator.
 =  Bank profit
 =  Share of performing loans to total loans made by the bank
 =  Macroeconomic risk, Indonesia CDS 1Y – Spread
 =  Total bank loans
 =  Total bank deposits, represented by total Third Party Funds
 =  Net interest margin (NIM)
3.4.  List of Variables
Table 3 gives complete list of variables employed in the empirical estimation. In total, the data set 
contain unbalanced panel data of 150 individual conventional bank balance sheet in Indonesia. 
Focus variables on this study are comprised of four variables. First, the business cycle 
macro risk, which is represented by CDS spread. In line with theoretical framework on this 
study which is based on Acharya and Naqvi (2012), this study then uses CDS spread rather than 
GDP which is very common to represent business cycle. On their paper, Acharya and Naqvi 
(2012) specifically recommend to use commercial paper spread as the measure of business 
cycle fluctuations. However, due to limitation and irregularity of commercial paper spread 
data in Indonesia, this study then employs credit default swap (CDS) spread data, which also 
represents macroeconomic risk. 
The second focus variable of this study is bank lending, which represents credit cycle. 
The data come from individual bank balance sheet. All bank balance sheet data are acquired 
from website of Bank Indonesia and Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, which are based on monthly 
and quarterly report of bank balance sheet. Bank lending data employed in this study uses 
outstanding credit data on the balance sheet. The data is then transformed into natural logarithm 
and then extracted to its cycle component using Hodrick-Presscott Filter. The third focus variable 
is performing loan ( ), which represents the risk cycle. The data acquired from Net Non-
Performing Loan (NPL) data, specifically  = 100 - NPL. The data is then transformed into 
natural logarithm and the cycle component is extracted. Lastly, the fourth focus variable is bank 
performance, which is represented by the bank quarter profit. The data is also transformed into 
natural logarithm and then extracted to its cycle component. 
Besides of the focus variables, there are also two other variables which are theoretically 
important, the deposit and net interest margin. The deposit data is sum of the total of third 
party fund, comprised of giro, savings and time-deposit. The data is transformed into natural 
log and its cycle component is extracted. Meanwhile the Net Interest Margin (NIM) data is 
employed as substitute of loan rate and deposit rate. The use of this substitute is due to bank 
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do not report their loan rate and deposit rate in their balance sheet, but they report their net 
interest margin, which is the difference of both. The data is extracted into its cycle component 
by using HP filter.
Variables Symbol Unit Source Treatment
Business Cycle Macro Risk
Credit Default Swap (CDS) –
Spread
Percentage Bloomberg
Cycle
Credit Cycle
Bank Lending Million Rp OJK Cycle of Natural Log
Risk Cycle
Performing Loan Percentage OJK Cycle
Bank Performance
Profit Million Rp OJK Cycle of Natural Log
Bank Specific–Theoretically 
Important
Net Interest Margin (NIM) Percentage OJK Cycle
Deposit–Third Party Fund 
*OJK stands for Otoritas Jasa Keuangan or Financial Service Authority
Million Rp OJK Cycle of Natural Log
Table 3.
List of Variables
IV.  RESULT AND ANALYSIS
4.1.  Estimation Result
The suitability of the theoretical framework and rich feature of VAR estimation method has made 
it possible to answer all research questions in only one estimation process. VAR estimation is 
conducted with variables lag of 3 and instrument lag of 1/9. The complete result of tests and 
estimations are in the Appendix section. 
Table 4 presented unit-root stationarity test based on Panel ADF-Fisher tests. All variables 
are stationary at level. Thus, there is no need to conduct cointegration. This condition means 
VAR model is eligible to be applied to analyze the data. This study applies VAR estimation based 
on GMM developed by Abrigo and Love. If the variables are found to be non-stationary at level, 
then VEC Model need to be considered.
Table 4.
ADF-Fisher Panel Unit-Root Test
Variable ADF-Fisher Prob Variable ADF-Fisher Prob
business cycle macro risk 0.000 nim 0.000
credit cycle 0.000 deposit 0.000
risk cycle 0.000 profit 0.000
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With selected lag specification, VAR stability check indicates stability of the model (Figure 
10). It can be concluded as all eigenvalue lie inside the unit circle. It means that all eigenvalue has 
value equal to or less than 1. This stability condition is necessary for VAR estimation otherwise 
the estimation result become unreliable for analysis and the VAR system need to be recalibrated.
Figure 10.
VAR Stabtility Check Result
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Results presented on this section are arranged following 8 research questions of this study. 
Each sub-section (from 5.1.1. to 5.1.8.) address one research question. The results presented 
are VAR estimation result, Granger Causality wald-exogeneity test result, and Cholesky IRF 
result. From those result each research question can be comprehensively addressed so that the 
aim of this study can be fulfilled.
4.1.1.  Tri-Cycles Dynamics
Estimation result from VAR and Granger Causality test reveal bi-directional cyclicality between 
business cycle macro risk and credit cycle. VAR estimation result indicate that shock in the credit 
cycle has lagged impact toward the business cycle macro risk (Table 5). On the other hand, shock 
in business cycle macro risk also has significant impact toward credit cycle. Granger Causality 
test results resembles the VAR estimation result. It reveals bi-direction relationship between 
business cycle macro risk and credit cycle. From the result can be inferred that the credit cycle 
granger-cause the business cycle macro risk. While on the opposite, the business cycle macro 
risk granger-cause the credit cycle. Cholesky Impulse Response Function shows that shock in 
the credit cycle has lagged impact over the business cycle macro risk and the pattern is stable. 
Meanwhile business cycle macro risk has considerably unstable response toward shock in credit 
cycle (Figure 11).
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Estimation result from VAR and Granger Causality test also reveal bi-directional cyclicality 
between business cycle and risk cycle. VAR estimation result indicate that shock in the risk cycle 
has lagged impact toward the business cycle macro risk (Table 5). On the other hand, shock 
in business cycle macro risk also has significant indirect impact toward risk cycle. Granger 
Causality test results resembles the VAR estimation result. It reveals bi-directional relationship 
between business cycle macro risk and risk cycle. From the result can be inferred that the risk 
cycle granger-cause the business cycle macro risk. While on the opposite, the business cycle 
macro risk also granger-cause the risk cycle. Based on IRF pattern, risk cycle exhibit unstable 
response toward shock in business cycle macro risk (Figure 11).
Variable 
VAR Estimation Result
Dependent Variable Prob >chi2 
Business 
Cycle 
Macro 
Risk 
( ) 
Credit 
Cycle ( ) 
7.2628 
-6.9603 
2.5197 
0.002 
0.015 
0.035 
0.000 
-0.0063 
0.0044 
-0.0026 
0.000 
0.002 
0.046 
0.000 
Business 
Cycle 
Macro 
Risk 
( ) 
Risk Cycle 
( ) 
-0.0054 
0.0044 
-0.0485 
0.665 
0.766 
0.004 
0.024 
-0.1132 
-0.0261 
-0.0030 
0.004 
0.628 
0.953 
0.000 
Credit 
Cycle ( ) 
Risk Cycle 
( ) 
0.0006 
0.0009 
0.0018 
0.297 
0.102 
0.002 
0.000 
5.6197 
1.5556 
1.4232 
0.000 
0.067 
0.047 
0.000 
Table 5.
VAR Estimation and Granger Causality Result
Prob > |z|Coefficient Independent
Granger-Causality 
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Figure 11.
Tri-Cycles Dynamics
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As for credit cycle and risk cycle, VAR estimation result indicate that shock in the credit 
cycle affect the risk cycle. On the oppposite, shock in risk cycle also has significant impact 
toward credit cycle (Table 5). The result are also supported by Granger-Causality test, in which 
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it reveals two-way relationship between credit cycle and risk cycle. From the result can be 
inferred that the credit cycle granger-causes the risk cycle. While on the opposite, the risk cycle 
also granger-causes the credit cycle. The IRF pattern reveals considerably unstable response of 
risk cycle toward shock in credit cycle. Meanwhile at the opposite, credit cycle has stable and 
increasing response toward shock in risk cycle.
4.1.2.  Tri-Cycles and Bank Performance
Estimation result from VAR and Granger Causality test reveal one-way cyclicality between 
business cycle macro risk and bank performance (profit). VAR estimation result indicate that 
shock in business cycle macro risk has impact toward bank performance (Table 6). On the 
other hand, as shown by the estimation result, shock in bank performance does not seem to 
have significant impact toward business cycle macro risk. Granger Causality test results confirm 
the VAR estimation result. It reveals one-way relationship between business cycle macro risk 
and bank performance. Business cycle macro risk granger-cause bank performance. While on 
Variable 
VAR Estimation Result
Dependent Variable Prob >chi2 
Table 6.
Estimation Result: Business Cycle and Bank Performance
Prob > |z|Coefficient Independent
Granger-Causality 
Business 
Cycle 
Macro Risk 
( ) 
Bank 
Performance 
( ) 
-0.0117 
0.0193 
-0.0006 
0.312 
0.077 
0.957 
0.246 
0.1404 
0.0275 
-0.2195 
0.227 
0.827 
0.014 
0.006 
Credit Cycle 
( ) 
Bank 
Performance 
( ) 
-0.0003 
0.0004 
-0.0005 
0.473 
0.345 
0.232 
0.530 
-13.8393 
29.0063 
-13.4835 
0.063 
0.003 
0.010 
0.011 
Bank 
Performance 
( ) 
Risk Cycle 
( ) 
-0.0203 
-0.0074 
0.0152 
0.223 
0.666 
0.307 
0.430 
0.0994 
-0.0363 
0.0493 
0.036 
0.524 
0.284 
0.075 
428 Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 4, April 2017
the opposite, bank performance does not granger-cause business cycle macro risk. Figure 12 
presents Cholesky Impulse Response Function of Tri-Cycles and bank performance. Shock in 
business cycle macro risk has lagged impact over bank performance. The IRF pattern show 
cyclical behavior of bank performance caused by the shock from business cycle macro risk.
Credit cycle has lagged impact toward bank performance as shown by estimation result 
(Table 6). On the other hand, shock in bank performance does not have impact toward credit 
cycle. Granger Causality also confirm VAR estimation result. Credit cycle granger-cause bank 
performance meanwhile on the opposite, bank performance does not granger-cause the credit 
cycle. The Cholesky IRF pattern result exhibit cyclical pattern of the response of bank performance 
caused by shock in credit cycle. 
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Figure 12.
Impulse Response Function: Business Cycle Macro Risk and Bank Performance
Shock in the the risk cycle has weak impact toward bank performance (Table 6). On the 
oppposite, shock in bank performance does not has impact toward the risk cycle. Granger 
Causality test results resembles the VAR estimation result. It can be inferred that the risk cycle 
weakly granger-causes bank performance. While on the opposite, bank performance does not 
granger-causes the risk cycle. The Cholesky IRF of the risk cycle and bank performance reveals 
unstable response pattern of bank performance toward shock in risk cycle.
4.1.3.  Business Cycle Macro Risk Dynamics: Credit Cycle and Risk Cycle
Figure 13 present Cholesky IRF of response of the credit cycle and risk cycle due to shock from 
the business cycle macro risk. The left side is the IRF of the credit cycle. Meanwhile the right 
side is the IRF of the risk cycle. By comparing the left picture and the right picture, it can be 
seen different response of the credit cycle and the risk cycle toward shock of business cycle 
macro risk. Credit cycle reveals stable response pattern toward shock in business cycle macro 
risk. Meanwhile risk cycle exhibit cyclical response toward shock in business cycle. 
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Figure 13.
Response of Credit Cycle and Risk Cycle toward Shock in Business Cycle Macro Risk
Figure 14.
Cumulative Response of Credit Cycle and Risk Cycle toward Shock in Business Cycle
Comparison of these two IRF responses give comprehensive answer toward the first of 
two main research questions addressed by this study, expecially to explain cyclical relationship 
of the Tri-Cycles. By the magnitude of response, the result is clear. Risk cycle tends to be more 
sensitive toward business cycle macro risk shock rather than credit cycle. 
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Meanwhile Figure 13 presents Cumulative Cholesky IRF of the credit cycle and risk cycle 
in cumulative version. The IRF show negative relationship of shock in business cycle macro 
risk toward credit cycle. The IRF of risk cycle also show similar result. The overall impact of 
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Figure 15.
Response of Bank Performance toward shocks in Credit Cycle and Risk Cycle
shock business cycle macro risk toward risk cycle is negative. Since business cycle macro risk is 
represented by Indonesia CDS 1Y spread, increase in the spread means contraction in business 
cycle macro risk. Negative relationship among business cycle macro risk and credit cycle thus 
has meaning of pro-cyclicality of lending behavior in Indonesia banking system. As the CDS 
spread increase, which is sign of increase in macroeconomic risk, means the economy is in bad 
condition. The condition then result in the slowing down of lending given by banks. Meanwhile 
for the risk cycle, which is represented by Performing Loan, increase in CDS spread will lower 
the performing loan level at individual bank. The result is then in line with the logic mentioned 
in figure Figure 7, where deterioriation of economic condition will further give negative effect 
toward both bank and firm balance sheet.
4.1.4.  Bank Performance Dynamics: Credit Cycle and Risk Cycle
Figure 15 presents Cholesky IRF of the response of bank performance caused by shock in credit 
cycle and risk cycle. The left side is the IRF describing impact in profit due to shock in the credit 
cycle. Meanwhile the right side is the IRF of shock in the risk cycle toward profit. By comparing 
the left picture and the right picture, it can be seen common response of bank performance, 
as represented by profit, caused by shock in the credit cycle and the risk cycle. Both credit cycle 
and risk cycle cause cyclical response toward bank performance. However, shock from risk cycle 
shows a bit more unstable response compared to shock from the credit cycle. 
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Comparison of these two IRF responses give answer toward the second question of two 
main research questions addressed by this study, especially to explain loss of profit opportunity 
borne by banks due to risk control and credit control regulation. By the magnitude of response, 
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the result is clear. Bank performane tends to be more sensitive toward credit cycle shock rather 
than risk cycle. As presented by model of Acharya and Naqvi (2012), bank lending is direct 
risk-taking action. Bank takes more risk when it decide to give more lending. Meanwhile risk 
cycle can be interpreted as indirect form of risk-taking as its not only affected by credit, but 
also other factors. This result strengthens the notion of “high risk – high return” in banking 
business. So that credit-control and risk-control regulation imposed by regulator might impact 
the profitability of banks. 
Figure 16. Cumulative Response of Bank Performance toward
shocks in Credit Cycle and Risk Cycle
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Figure 16 presents Cholesky IRF of bank performance as impacted by the credit cycle 
and risk cycle, in cumulative version. The IRF show negative relationship of shock in credit cycle 
toward bank performance. This result means that by expanding its lending, the bank takes more 
risk, which might lower the profitability. While the IRF of bank performance due to shock in risk 
cycle show positive relationship. Positive shock in risk cycle, which is represented by increase 
in performing loan level, will have positive impact toward bank profit. This result emphasize 
the importance of risk management at internal bank level both in the form of prudence credit 
assessment and supervision. Profit maximization at individual bank level is very sensitive toward 
dynamics of credit cycle and crisk cycle.
4.2. Discussion
4.2.1.  A Tale of Two Cycles: Business Cycle (Macro Risk) and Financial Cycle
Seminal work of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist / BGG (1999) has broadened the scope of 
business cycle literatures by promoting the important role of financial cycle in business cycle 
analysis. The term “Financial Accelerator” became popular and subject of many researches in 
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macroeconomics. Financial accelerator phenomenon addresses the dynamics of financial cycle 
which propagates to output fluctuation. However, the formal model presented by them is not 
suitable enough for study at individual bank level. The framework is too macro for such study. 
This study unexpectedly exhibits the financial accelerator phenomenon in Indonesia 
banking system in the period of 2005q1 to 2014q4. VAR estimation and Granger-Causality 
yield result that support the existence of financial accelerator phenomenon. However, this 
claim only applies in financial market context, because this study employs macroeconomic 
risk – rather than GDP – as representation of business cycle. VAR estimation result give a sign 
of significant relationship between credit cycle to business cycle macro risk and between risk 
cycle to business cycle macro risk. 
As in BGG (1999), such phenomenon is caused by the existence of credit market frictions. 
In such ideal world, financial market is perfectly efficient so that every agent in economy can 
recalculate their decision instantly if any shock happens. Three features of credit market frictions 
in the BGG model are (i) money and price stickiness; (ii) lags in investment; and (iii) heterogeneity 
among firms. This study, even though is not specifically intended to examine BGG framework, 
accommodates those three features in some way. First, money and price stickiness are accounted 
in the estimation with net interest margin as representative of cost of fund. Second, lags in 
investment, which is represented by credit cycle, is accounted in the estimation which the result 
reveales lagged / indirect / non-contemporaneus effect between credit cycle and business cycle 
macro risk. Third, the heterogeneity of firms is presented by the span of the data which cover 
the whole conventional bank population in Indonesia. In total, the observation covers up to 
119 banks which differs significantly in term of size and market specialization. However, since 
BGG model is not the fundamental of this study, this study cannot infer any conclusion based 
on the model. There is a room for future study to examine this phenomenon with BGG model 
in Indonesia banking industry. 
4.2.2.  Inside the Financial Cycle: Credit Cycle and Risk Cycle
As Acharya and Naqvi (2012) published their work about the “Seeds of Crisis”, scope of the 
business cycle once again became more comprehensive. Financial cycle, which was solely 
represented by credit cycle, started to account the importance of risk dynamics. Their model 
talks about the process of building-up of of a bubble in the economy, which then turns into 
crisis when it bursts.
This study only implements the beginning phase of the model presented by Acharya 
and Naqvi (2012). This study focuses on the propagation of shock in business cycle macro risk 
toward balance sheet of individual bank. The whole study is conducted in the business cycle 
context, in which all variables are extracted to its cycle component.
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Estimation result exhibits pro-cyclicality behavior of the credit cycle toward business cycle 
macro risk. Deterioration of business condition, represented by increase in macroeconomic risk, 
will further decrease bank lending. When this context is about to happen, such counter-cyclical 
policy by the regulator is very important to prevent deeper deterioration of the economy.
Meanwhile risk cycle is shown to be unstable along the fluctuation in business cycle macro 
risk. The relationship is also pro-cyclical. Deterioration of business condition, represented by 
increase in macroeconomic risk, will further decrease the rate of performing loan. Therefore, 
such counter-cyclical policy which focuses on risk cycle need to be enhanced to prevent deeper 
contraction.
4.2.3.  Fund Allocation and Performance Risk
As the bank get liquidity flush resulted from business cycle swing, it has two option to increase 
risk; it can either simply lend more money to borrower with similar risk profile or conduct risk-
shifting activity by giving credit to other borrower with worse risk profile. In other words, the 
bank can simply switch into riskier assets. Unfortunately the data and capability of the model 
applied in this study cannot observe this phenomenon closer. The only available channel to 
explain risk-taking activity in the model is represented by the bank distribute more credit.
This feature then make the model assume that risk in the model are solely caused from 
increasing amount of the credit. Meanwhile the risk profile of the projects to invested by the 
banks does not vary. This disadvantage gives the room for further improvement of the model. 
Separating low-risk project and high-risk project will make the model able to explain the risk-
taking behaviour more resourceful. The dynamics of risk cycle is then no more solely depend 
on the growth of credit, but also structure of asset of the bank.
4.2.4.  Liquidity and Risk-Taking
As the framework predict, we get a sign of pro-cyclicality between deposit and credit cycle. In 
the model, risk-taking activity is proxied by bank-lending. When the bank lend more money, 
that means the bank take more risk and this is the exact moment of the emergence of the seeds 
of a crisis. Flush of liquidity into the bank will induce risk-taking behavior, which is represented 
by the bank channeling more credit into the economy.
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Figure 17.
IRF of Credit Cycle and Deposit
In the next episode of the model, this risk-appetite will stimulate excessive credit volume 
channeled into the market, which then result in asset price bubbles. However, that episode 
is beyond the scope of this study and is subject for further research. From bank’s internal 
perspective, the model tells that this behavior is supposed to result in punishment if the 
manager of the bank get “caught” for practicing excessive lending. Another concern of the 
bank manager behavior in the moment of liquidity flush is that the manager might underprice 
of risk of projects or a credit. This will result on asset prices bubble in the long run.
Further the model also addresses a more detail aspect of excessive lending activity. The 
model tells that flush of liquidity into the bank will trigger excessive lending through the bank 
manager will set lower rate of lending. This logic is strongly supported by the estimation result. 
Net Interest Margin (NIM), which represents rate of lending and deposit react negatively to 
shock in deposit. This counter-cyclical behavior indicate that banks tend to lower its lending 
rate, as shown by low NIM. The result also confirm counter-cyclical relationship of credit cycle to 
shock in NIM. Lower NIM will trigger over-lending and then will result on bigger compensation 
received by the bank manager.
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Figure 18. NIM, Deposit, and Credit Cycle
At practical level, the story is more interesting. Many banks in Indonesia are outsourcing 
some of its activity to the third-party service provider. This behavior makes Otoritas Jasa Keuangan 
(OJK) or Indonesia Financial Service Authority impose a regulation, even though very loose, to 
remind banks to pay close attention about this outsourcing practice. One of the most popular 
practice is on marketing division, both at deposit side and credit side. The regulation states 
that the bank may outsource some only its low-risk activities to the third-party. Some activities 
on this classification for instance are call center services and telemarketing services, as clearly 
stated by the regulation (OJK, 2017). This regulation is a clear example that macroprudential 
regulation has thouched deeply into the bank daily activity. On the one hand, this regulation is 
a good example of comprehensive microprudential regulation in Indonesia. On the other hand, 
as much concerned by this study, every regulation has tendency to overstring bank activity, 
which may impact the bank performance. 
4.2.5.  Performance Dynamics and Reponse of Banker and Regulator
This study further contributes by accommodating bank performance dynamics in the discussion 
on context of the business cycle dynamics. For the bankers, profit is one of the most important 
barometer of their success. This notion applies since bank as a financial institution is basically 
similar with other business entity, in sense that their objective is to maximize profit.
The model presented by Acharya and Naqvi (2012) is very suitable not only to discuss 
policy-making context, but also profit maximization behavior of the bank. The existance of 
relationship between Tri-Cycles and bank performance in the model make it possible to explain 
the sensitivity of bank performance along fluctuation of business cycle. 
Business cycle, through credit cycle and risk cycle, is shown to play important role in 
determining bank performance (profitability). The result obtained in this study also shows that 
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the notion “high risk - high return” applies in banking business. Therefore, regulator need to 
be aware of the trade-off faced in regulating the banking system. Shock in the business cycle 
macro risk clearly give more unstable effect toward risk cycle rather than credit cycle. The result 
also reveals considerably similar cyclical and unstable behavior of bank profit toward shock in 
credit cycle and risk cycle. 
For the bank, this result means the bank needs to pay close attention to both credit 
cycle and risk cycle. Both variable are significant, sensitive and unstable in affecting dynamics 
of profit. Role of internal audit to ensure compliance of credit process needs to be strengthen. 
The separation of credit analyst autority and marketing division is one of a good example of 
internal control in the bank.
Meanwhile for regulator, they clearly need to give focus on risk cycle due to its higher 
sensitivity rather than credit cycle toward shock in business cycle macro risk. The regulation on 
bank lending might be made a bit more adjustable as long as the bank can maintain its NPL level.
Overall, the model presented by Acharya and Naqvi (2012), which is applied in this study, 
seems to be very resourceful in addressing the dynamics of Tri-Cycles and bank performance. 
In the context of crisis, the model on its complete setting can be applied to examine the step-
by-step of risk built-up and the burst of the bubble in the economy.
V.  CONCLUSION
5.1.  Tri-Cycles Dynamics and Bank Performance
The result of this study, as presented in Section 5, has successfully answered two main topics 
addressed. First, dynamic cyclical relationship among the Tri-Cycles: (i) business cycle macro 
risk; (ii) credit cycle; and (iii) risk cycle. Second, dynamic relationship between the Tri-Cycles 
and bank performance, or exactly the profit. 
Figure 19.
Result of the Study: Tri-Cycles and Bank Performance
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Figure 19 wraps up the conclusion of this study. First, business cycle macro risk and credit 
cycle exhibit two-way strong relationship, in which shock in credit cycle has significant impact 
toward business cycle macro risk and vice versa. Second, business cycle macro risk and risk 
cycle shows bi-directional strong relationship. Shock in business cycle macro risk has significant 
impact toward risk cycle. However, shock in risk cycle only has weak impact to business cycle 
macro risk. Third, credit cycle and risk cycle both are inter-dependent which means shock in 
each cycle has significant impact toward its counterpart. 
Fourth, business cycle macro risk and bank performance indicates one-way relationship. 
Shock in business cycle macro risk has weak impact to bank performance. Fifth, credit cycle 
and bank performance has one-way relationship in which credit cycle has significant impact 
toward bank performance. Sixth, risk cycle and bank performance has one-way relationship in 
which risk cycle has weak impact toward bank performance.
Seventh, when comparing impact of shock of business cycle macro risk toward credit 
cycle and risk cycle, it can be inferred that risk cycle is more sensitive. The Cholesky IRF reveals 
response of response of risk cycle toward shock in business cycle macro risk. Last, eighth, bank 
performance seems to be sensitive toward both shock of risk cycle and credit cycle.
5.2.  Notable Contributions
This study exhibits the initial finding of the existence of financial accelerator phenomenon in 
Indonesia. The result show dynamics of financial cycle – in the form of credit cycle and risk 
cycle -  preceded the business cycle macro risk. This study then has contributed to the business 
cycle literature by revealing this phenomenon especially in emerging country. This finding is 
very important in order to deeply understand the financial cycle characteristic in Indonesia. 
Further research need to extend the analysis by examining real output fluctuation, which was 
not addressed in this study.
This study is also one of the first to employ CDS spread as alternative representative of 
the business cycle fluctuation in Indonesia. Especially since previous studies mostly employed 
GDP as representative of business cycle fluctuation. In fact, Indonesia did not experience GDP 
contraction in 2007/8 financial crisis. So GDP can explain almost nothing when examining 
business cycle fluctuation in the episode of 2007/8 financial crisis in Indonesia. 
Furthermore, most studies addressed financial cycle issue by only focusing on credit cycle. 
This study is then one of the first to examine financial cycle in the form of credit cycle and risk 
cycle at individual bank level in Indonesia. Risk cycle – besides of credit cycle – has attracted 
many attentions after 2007/8 crisis. Credit cycle can no more solely explain the dynamics of 
financial cycle and its relationship with business cycle.
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In term of econometrical method, this study attempted to employ a newly developed 
statistical package – Panel VAR / PVAR – from Abrigo and Love (2015). VAR approach which 
had long historical implementation in time series context is now possible to be implemented 
in panel context because of this package.  
5.3.  Recommendations
From the stance of the policy maker, specifically banking regulator, the result obtained in this 
study reveal the cyclical and unstable response of the financial cycle (credit and risk) due to 
shock in business cycle macro risk. The result then gives important insight for the regulator 
in the implementation of counter-cyclical policy to maintain the bank balance sheet stability.
For market participants, especially the bankers, this study has revealed unstable response 
of profit due to the shock in business cycle through the risk and credit channel. This result 
somewhat strengthens the existence of the notion of “high risk – high return” in the banking 
business. The bankers then need to give special attention in the internal bank risk cycle, along 
with the internal bank credit cycle. As modeled by theoretical framework used in this study, 
the bankers are assumed to get more bonuses by selling more credit. The bankers might need 
to find the alternative scheme of incentive in lending system. Separation of the marketing 
department with the credit approval analyst is one of good example. The bankers might also 
consider the effectiveness of flat incentive system in credit selling. However, this study does 
not intend to examine these alternatives. Further research is needed to provide comprehensive 
discussion toward this topic.
5.4.  Disadvantages and Suggestion for Further Research
From the point of view of econometrical approach, Panel VAR approach employed in this 
study gives satisfying solution. If it seems possible, further study might explore a more complex 
statistical setting such as Panel VECM approach to conduct more comprehensive examination.
For further research, it might be very fruitful if the design of this research can be uplifted 
to cover cross-country experience, such as ASEAN countries. By doing so, the study will reveal 
cross-country variation of the Tri-Cycles dynamics. Such setting is very important regarding the 
fact that Indonesia as single country did not experience contraction in GDP cycle in financial 
crisis 2007/8. While other countries in ASEAN such as Singapore and Malaysia did.
Finally, recalling the complete formal model presented by Acharya and Naqvi (2012), 
the design employed in this study has not yet captured the whole feature of the model. Their 
model essentially was designed to explain the full story of the birth of crisis, which they called 
as “The Seeds of Crisis”. So, the story presented by this study is only the beginning phase of 
the complete tale covered by the model. Further research certainly need to address the model 
in complete setting.
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